Raytheon Hawker 800XP hard landing at Farmingdale, NY.
CAUSE & CIRCUMSTANCE
The minimums for the ILS approach to runway 14 at Republic airport (FRG) in Farmingdale, New York are 200 ft. above the runway and 0.75 mile visibility. A Raytheon Hawker 800XP crew tried to fly that approach when the visibility was 0.25 mile and almost made it.
The approach proceeded normally until the very end. The first officer (FO), who was flying, could not see the runway well enough to know when to flare. The airplane hit hard, the airplane was severely damaged and the FO suffered debilitating injuries.
The accident points to the difficulty of adjusting expectations after the approach has already been briefed. The two pilots expected the visibility to be 0.75 mile; that’s what was reported on the automatic terminal information service (ATIS). When the visibility dropped after they had commenced the approach, they had to decide quickly to continue or abandon the approach. The Part 91 “look see” logic drew them on.
The crew began their duty day at noon on Dec. 20, 2020. They flew six passengers from Westchester County Airport (HPN) to Ocean Reef Airport (07FA) in Florida, then flew back to their home base at Farmingdale after stopping at Opa Locka (OPF) for fuel. The trip to Florida was Part 135; the return was a Part 91 positioning flight. Only the two pilots were aboard. It was the last day of a four-day trip.
It was already dark in New York when the flight took off. The Hawker jet, N412JA, was fueled to 7,000 lb. at OPF and the planned burn for the 2-hr. and 35-min. flight was 4,081 lb. The captain filed an alternate, Teterboro (TEB), but he expected FRG to be 800 ft. overcast and 6 miles visibility when they arrived. A diversion seemed unlikely.
According to the NTSB, the nearest terminal forecast (TAF) was for JFK airport, 17 nm west of FRG. That forecast was winds variable at 4 kt, 6 miles visibility, few clouds at 700 ft. and a broken deck at 2,500 ft. The New York area forecast said “patchy fog will have to be monitored closely overnight.”
Arriving from the south, the flight was routed by SARDI intersection and Calverton VOR, descending to 7,000 ft. MSL. The two pilots discussed conditions at both TEB and Islip (ISP) and went over the go-around procedure. It was “go around, go around, thrust, flaps 15, positive rate gear up, FMS NAV FLCH.” They discussed the normal minimums for the approach. According to the approach chart, the decision altitude (DA) for the ILS-14 was 277 ft., which was 200 feet above touchdown, and the minimum visibility required was 0.75 mile.
At 2018 EST, about 17 min. before landing, the crew tuned and monitored the FRG ATIS. It was: “information X-Ray, 0053Z, winds 040 deg. at 3 kts., visibility 0.75 mile with mist, ceiling 200 ft. overcast, temperature 1 deg. C, dewpoint 0 deg. C, altimeter setting 30.04, runway condition code 5-5-5, 100% wet.”
Conditions were worsening.At 2023, New York Approach Control told the flight to expect vectors to the ILS to runway 14, and the crew set up and briefed the approach. The briefing included a Vref of 117 kt. The likely approach speed was 122 kt.
As they neared the localizer, they extended the flaps to 15 deg.
At 2031:32 New York Approach said, “Talon flight nine forty one four miles from FRIKK turn left heading one seven zero maintain one thousand six hundred until established on the localizer cleared I-L-S runway one four approach.”
After the read back, at 2032:17, New York Approach said, “Talon flight nine forty one contact Republic tower one one eight point eight.” The captain acknowledged and a moment later the FO called for the landing gear down.
When the captain checked in with Republic Tower, he reported still outside of FRIKK, the final approach fix. The tower cleared the flight to land. They added “last aircraft uh about five minutes ago reported mins uh bases right at the mins.”
The crew extended the flaps to 25 deg. as the glide slope came alive. Just at that moment, the tower said “uh new weather's comin' out looks like visibility has dropped a little bit to one-quarter and uh fog indefinite ceiling two hundred temperature one dewpoint minus one altimeter three zero zero three.”
That patchy fog the weather service warned about in its area forecast was arriving.
There was about a 10-sec. delay before the captain replied, “understood Talon flight nine forty one.” Then in quick order, the two pilots agreed. The captain said, “all right we're part ninety one we're inside the fix,” and “we’ll continue.” The FO concurred but said “we will be ready to go.” Flaps were set to full.
At 2033:33 the FO said “I'm inside, you're outside.” The captain agreed and completed the landing checklist except for autopilot and yaw damper.
At 2033:41 an electronic voice driven by the radar altimeter announced “one thousand.” The captain made his own callouts, starting with 500 ft. above the set decision height of 200 ft. AGL. After calling out “one hundred” and at the same time as the electronic voice called out “minimums,” he said at 2034:56 “all right I got lights,” and the FO said “continuing.”
Four seconds later the captain said, “there are the rabbits do you see ‘em?” and “red terminating bar lights,” and the FO said “landing.”
Runway 14’s approach light array, a medium intensity MALSF system, does have three sequenced flashing lights (rabbits), but does not have red terminating bars or, for that matter, any red lights at all.
Passing 100 ft., the captain said, “there’s the runway” and the FO said, “give me lights.” He did not call out seeing anything
The FO disconnected the autopilot as the airplane passed 50 ft. and began reducing engine thrust. As the airplane passed 30 ft., the captain called out “flare, flare, flare”! then “to the left, to the left, you’re sliding!”
The airplane was below 20. Ft. when the FO called out “take it, take it.” The captain did not take control of the airplane. He called out “go around go around go around,” and the FO repeated “go around go around thrust flaps 15.” The FO pressed the TOGA switch and advanced the thrust levers to full thrust. The command bars came to a nose up position, and engine data later showed the engines spooled up to 90-95% N1, but the airplane continued to sink. The captain recalled that the airspeed was between 110-115 kts.
At 2035:27 the airplane impacted the right side of the runway. All three landing gear broke off and the airplane slid off the runway to the right, spinning around and finally stopping about 1,500 ft. beyond the landing point. The captain shut down the engines, made a MAYDAY call on the radio and worked with first responders to evacuate the airplane.
The InvestigationAs is common in limited investigations, NTSB investigators did not travel to the scene. An FAA inspector from the Farmingdale FSDO responded to the accident scene, took photos and documented the wreckage. That inspector was a party to the investigation, along with the operator, Talon Air, and the engine manufacturer, Honeywell. Talon Air’s director of operations completed the NTSB form 6120, from which some of the final report’s details were drawn.
The Raytheon Hawker 800XP, manufactured in 2001, had accumulated 12,731.5 hrs. at the time of the accident. Data downloaded from the engine’s digital electronic control units showed there were no engine malfunctions, and the NTSB accepted the statements from Talon Air and the crew that there were no mechanical issues with the airplane.
The airplane’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was recovered and sent to the NTSB’s vehicle recorder lab. The FAA inspector and a Talon Air captain, along with the NTSB’s recorder specialist, formed a CVR group and auditioned the recording. The quality of the recording was excellent. The investigator in charge (IIC) decided that only 7 min. of the 30 min. recording should be transcribed. The remainder of the recording was summarized by the recorder specialist.
The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) and ADS-B data was not used in the investigation. The facts in the case seem pretty clear without them, except for the movement of the pilot yokes on the attempted go around.
The 37-yr.-old captain held multi-engine ATP and CFII certificates and had accumulated 4,188 total flight hrs., 2,060 of which were in the Hawker jet. He told investigators that most of his time was in the Hawker 900, with about 100-250 hrs. in the 800 model. He said he had logged about 2,300-2,400 hrs. in Part 135 operations. There were no restrictions or limitations on his first-class medical certificate.
The captain said he completed his pilot training in 2006 and was hired by Talon Air in May 2019. His employment in the interim was not stated. He was not asked about his experience or training in flying approaches below Category I minimums.
The FO was 63 yrs. old and held an ATP and a Hawker 800/900 type rating. There were no limitations on his first-class medical certificate. He had about 10,000 total flight hrs. and reported 4,100 hrs. on the Hawker, of which 2,500 was in the 800 model. He had transferred to Talon Air from another company one month before the accident and had only been line flying with them for two weeks.
The two pilots had not flown together before the accident trip, but both told investigators they worked together well. Both reported being healthy and well rested. Both had flown the ILS runway 14 approach many times and both had received company training on rejected landings from 50 ft. and missed approaches.
A note on the FRG ILS-14 approach plate says, “autopilot coupled approach NA below 310.” The CVR showed that the FO left the autopilot engaged to about 50 ft.
Meaning of 14 CFR 91.175Every instrument rated pilot has had to learn what’s said in 14 CFR 91.175, “Takeoff and landing under IFR.” Unlike 14 CFR 135.225, which pertains to Part 135 operations, and 14 CFR 121.651, which pertains to airline operations, the Part 91 regulation does not prohibit pilots from beginning an instrument approach when the ceiling and visibility are below prescribed minimums. When you are operating under Part 91, you are allowed to “look and see” if conditions are good enough to land.
That doesn’t mean you can land. You still have to comply with the prescribed DA/DH or minimum decision altitude (MDA), and you can’t go below it until you meet three criteria: you must be able to descend at a normal rate (not dive at the runway); the flight visibility must be at least as good as the minimums for the procedure; and you have to clearly see at least one of 10 specified elements of the runway environment.
One of those 10 elements is the approach lights. Just seeing approach lights alone is not good enough to descend below 100 ft. To do that you have to see red terminating bars or red side row bars, and they only apply where there are ALSF 1 or 2 light arrays.
When you are approaching a runway that doesn’t have an ALSF 1 or 2 light system and you are relying only on the lights, you can’t go below 100 ft. You are going to have to find one of the other nine elements to descend below the DA or MDA.
It is possible for pilots operating under Part 135 or 121 to continue an approach when ceiling or visibility has fallen below minimums. If you have already begun the final approach segment when you hear the new, lower weather report, you can continue to the DA or MDA. At that point, you have to comply with the same three conditions that apply to Part 91.
What is commonly taught to professional pilots in flight simulator training is that if you do see one of the 10 elements listed in 91.175 (c) (3) you may continue and land. The flight visibility requirement of subparagraph (c) (2) is forgotten, superseded by the pilot’s view of one of the elements of the runway environment.
I respectfully disagree. The regulation doesn’t become void the moment you see the threshold. The problem is figuring out how flight visibility translates to runway visibility. Flight visibility is what is seen from the cockpit in flight, and is measured by what prominent objects can be seen.
A pilot may be tempted to say the flight visibility is 0.75 mile, for example, but if he can’t see about 4,000 ft. ahead when at minimums, it’s doubtful he has adequate visibility for the approach. A MALSF light system, such as is installed at FRG, is 1,400 ft. long. When the sequenced flashing lights are first visible, the pilot should probably be able to see up to 2,600 ft. of the approach end of the runway.
The regulation is clear enough, but overly optimistic interpretation of the visibility by pilots in a fast moving airplane can quickly increase the risk of an accident.
Conclusions and CommentsWhether you’re in a car, truck or plane, when you’re on that last mile after being gone four days, you’re looking forward to being done. Our Hawker crew was homeward bound.
A MALSF approach lighting system diagram. Credit: Aeronautical Chart Users’ Guide (FAA)
Visual guidance lighting systems. Credit: Aeronautical Chart Users’ Guide
When they left OPA, they expected the ceiling and visibility to be 800 ft. and 6 miles at FRG, and the area forecast warning about patchy fog was not strong enough to alter their plan. However, the ceiling and visibility was gradually falling as the flight continued to its destination. The crew had a natural bias to continue. Plan continuation bias is the desire to continue with the original plan in spite of changing conditions and growing evidence that you should reconsider. It explains the crew’s mindset as they descended into Long Island.
Had the ceiling and visibility remained at or above the prescribed minimums, the crew in all likelihood would have landed successfully. When they got the news that the ceiling was now indefinite at 200 ft. and the visibility was 0.25 mile, they took about 10 seconds to absorb the information and make the decision to continue. They were only about 2 min. from touchdown.
Ten seconds was not enough time to consider how to fly what could be in effect a Cat II approach. They needed to verbalize when the autopilot would be disconnected, what the approach lights would need to look like, how much of the runway surface would need to be visible in order to land, and who would initiate and conduct a go-around.
Snow disruption on right side of runway with the airplane in the background. Credit FAA and NTSB
When the captain called out the red terminating bar lights, he was saying what he expected to see, not what was there. Human performance experts say expectation bias is when we have a strong belief or mindset towards something we expect to see or hear, and act according to those beliefs.
When the FO said in a post-accident interview that he saw REIL lights, he still believed those lights were there, but they weren’t. On the CVR, he never called out seeing anything. Investigators know that people often remember things that didn’t actually happen.
When the FO suddenly and unexpectedly relinquished control of the airplane below 20 ft., he caught the captain by surprise. The captain declined to take control of the airplane; doing so would have been a violation of the company’s “positive transfer of controls” policy. As a result, it appears that neither pilot pitched the airplane up to a go-around attitude.
Given that the FO was new to the operation, it’s not surprising that their crew coordination broke down at the last minute. Their crew resource management training wasn’t sufficient to ensure they both had an accurate shared mental model of how to conduct the approach with such low visibility.
The NTSB’s probable cause was “The flight crew’s delayed decision to initiate a go-around after the approach had become unstabilized, which resulted in a hard landing.”
I would add that the “look see” nature of Part 91.175 is an invitation to error. Weather conditions can change faster than your expectations. A safer policy would be to break off the approach and proceed to your alternate as soon as the visibility drops below minimums.
—A former military, corporate and airline pilot, Roger Cox was also a senior investigator at the NTSB. He writes about aviation safety issues.
