Jens Flottau The Airbus A330neo’s history has been full of twists and turns, but the latest performance changes indicate a change in direction.
Jens Flottau
Corsair has taken delivery of two A330neos this year. Credit: A. Doumenjou/Airbus
The Airbus A330neo’s history has been full of twists and turns. For many years, the aircraft has been Airbus’ answer to Boeing’s launch of the 787. The requirement to make the aircraft more capable over the years in payload and range has led to a massive increase in both maximum takeoff weight and range—to the current maximum of 251 tons and a range of 8,150 nm for the A330-800 and 7,200 nm for the larger -900. In the process, Airbus has turned the original A330-200/--300, which was a medium-haul, high-capacity aircraft somewhat like the A300/310, into a true long-haul jet.
But the latest performance changes, now approved by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), indicate a change in direction. EASA certified versions of the A330-800 and -900 that are much lower in weight than the in-service A330neo fleet. Maximum takeoff weight of the -800 and -900 so far varied between 230 and 251 tons, depending on the version the airlines wanted. Now additional versions of the -800 are offered as light as 200, 205, 210, 215 and 220 tons. Meanwhile, the -900 is available at 205, 210, 215 and 220 tons, besides the existing variants.
Due to a variety of factors, including lower airport fees, the changes could lead to a significant reduction in operating costs and make the aircraft more attractive to operators that do not need the long-range capabilities.
There are likely two main reasons that Airbus is broadening the A330neo offering. First, the aircraft is not selling well and had not been before the pandemic, when airlines were still in a buying mood. German leisure carrier Condor’s order for 16 aircraft does not much change the picture, as only a few of the aircraft are adding to the backlog. In other words, most orders come from lessors, and Condor is a niche operator with specific requirements that do not necessarily reflect those of the big legacy airlines Airbus had hoped to target with the A330neo.
The backlog is a mere 11 aircraft for the A330-800 but a more sizable 257 for the -900. However, the -900 orderbook looks better than it is: The orderbook includes 76 aircraft from AirAsia X, which has been grounded since the start of the pandemic and has indicated it no longer wants a large A330neo fleet. Airbus also still lists 28 aircraft for Iran Air and 42 for undisclosed customers, 38 of which are believed to be allocated for HNA Group, the distressed Chinese conglomerate that owns several airlines. That means almost 150 aircraft in the backlog are in doubt.
Unlike the original A330, the A330neo has not really taken off in Asia. The reason may well be that the A330neo is more capable (thus heavier and more expensive) than most Asia-Pacific airlines need for their medium-haul services. For long-haul routes, there is still the A350 or the Boeing 787 and 777. The lower-weight versions might address that issue.
The second reason for the broadening of the A330neo offering is competitive dynamics. Airbus has driven A330neo performance about as far as it can, and if airlines want even more, there is the A350. Boeing’s only new widebody project is the 777X, which exceeds A330neo capabilities anyway. But as Boeing ponders how to fill the gap between the 787 and the 737 MAX, Airbus has an incentive to make that decision as hard as possible for its competitor. The strategy has always been based on two pillars: attacking whatever Boeing offers from the top using the A330neo and from the bottom with the A321neo (the XLR version in particular). The two types pretty much cover the space for the time being, so Airbus can afford to wait for and react to a new Boeing initiative before making any massive moves. Until then, A330neos with lower takeoff weights are one easy way to handle the situation.
Airbus has always bet on the flexibility of the A330 and A330neo, but it has also had to correct some strategic mistakes. When Boeing launched the 787, Airbus initially pitched an aircraft to airlines that looked quite similar to today’s A330neo. Airlines and lessors—Steven Udvar-Hazy in particular—rejected the idea. The market response forced Airbus to launch an expensive development program for an all-new aircraft, the A350, which has become a success in both performance and customer acceptance. It is now also offered as a freighter. The A330neo came in behind the A350 finally, and ironically, Hazy’s Air Lease Corp. is now one of its biggest customers.
In response to the extremely low demand for widebodies in general, Airbus has been forced to reduce output to around two aircraft a month—with no prospect of the situation improving in the immediate future. But in spite of the current difficulties, the company has been clear that it has no plans whatsoever to terminate the program. It still sees strategic value in the A330neo.
